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NOTE .4ND COMMENT

. The recent case of Bisby v.
ALIENAION OF CONTINGENT RExMAInm
Walker, 169 N. W. 467, decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa November 23,
1918, is an interesting instance of an all too common lack of appreciation
and understanding of the very fundamentals of property law.
Under the will of her grandfather B became entitled to a contingent remainder (at least the court treated it as such) in certain lands; the contingency upon which her taking depended was her being one of the surviving
children of her mother at the time of the death of the life tenant, the testator's widow. During the continuance of the prior estate and therefore
while her remainder was contingent B executed several mortgages, some describing the mortgaged property by metes and bounds and some as all her
"right, title, and interest"' in the devised lailds. These mortgages all contained covenants for title or recitals indicating an intention to convey "absolute title in fee simple." While the remainder was still contingent, and after
the execution of all of the mortgages but one B went through bankruptcy and
received the usual discharge. It was held, undoubtedly correctly so, that the
mortgages were enforceable liens upon B's interest in the devised lands after
the death of the life tenant, B having survived her.
At common law contingent remainders being considered in the nature of
mere possilities (see Puiwood'$ Case, 4 Co. 64b, 66b; Lampet's Case, ioCo.

48 a) were deemed incapable of alienation by a conveyance at law, "otherwise
than by way of estoppel by fine (or by a common recovery, etc.)" Fe"Ne,
CONTINGENT REWAINDERS, *p.537. As to the operation of estoppel in these
cases iee Doe d. Christmas v. Oliver, io B & C, z8x. If, then, in Iowa contingent remainders such as B had in the principal case are incapable of conveyance except by the operation of an estoppel, it was necessary for the court
to consider whether the mortgage deeds were such as to raise an estoppel
and the effect thereon of a discharge in bankruptcy. Considerable space is
takcp up by the court in concluding that the mortgage deeds were such as to
raise an estoppel. It is then concluded that the discharge in bankruptcy did
not affect" the inurement of the after acquired title, though no attention is
given to the exceedingly interesting and nice point argued by PloRssoR
GRAY and disposed of by Mr. JusTrcs HoLMEs for the court in Ayer v. Philadelphia & B Face Brick Co., x59 Mass. 84. The bankruptcy discharge, so it
was said, could not affect the mortgagee's rights, for the mortgage liens had
fastened upon the property more than four months prior to the petition in
bankruptcy I

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Contingent remainders in England were made alienable by 8 & 9 Vict. c 106
(1845) 'the provision being a sweeping one. It is provided that "a contingent,
an executory and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest.
* * * whether the object of the gift or limitation of such interest or possibility
be or be not ascertained * * * may be disposed of by deed." In this country
statutory provisions to the same effect though generally not so explicit are
common. See STiMSON, AM. ST. LAw,'§r420. In Michigan the provision, essentially the same as in New York, provide6s that "Expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alienable, in the same manner as estates in possession."
Howsus STATS. (2nd ed.) io657. The remarkable thing about the principal
case is that in Iowa it has been settled that the statute providing that "Every
conveyance of real eitate passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless
a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used," enables a
contingent remainderman to make effective conveyances of the remainder.
This was settled in McDonald v. Bank, 123 Iowa 413; in whih the remainders
in question were contingent in the same way as in the principal case. The
McDonald case was cited by the court at the outset, with the statement that
"The mortgages, then, were valid when executed," which statement of course
is in keeping with the observation, referred to above, that the discharge in
bankruptcy did not displace the pre-existing liens created by the mortgages.
Without realizing that they had thus decided the case in the first two sentences stating the law applicable to the facts, the court went on to a consideration of the matter of inurement of after acquired title apparently being
led as-tray by several earlier Iowa cases, which are cited, in which the question of inurement by estoppel was vitally important for the reason that the
conveyances or mortgages were made at a time when the grantor or mortgagor had no interest in the premises, not even a contingent remainder.
It is held where contingent remainders are alienable that a mortgage thereof may be foreclosed even before the contingency is determined. Peoplei
Loan and Exchange Bank v. Garlingfon, 54 S.C. 413. And this would seem
entirely proper.
R.W.A.

